Tee Hit Ton Indians v. United States (1955) - Domination Translator Series - Part 9

Justice Stanley Reed delivered the decision for the majority. The opinion followed the legal brief of the U.S. Solicitor, Maryland judge Simon Sebeloff. That brief was centrally focused on the doctrine of discovery and domination, and the reasoning of the Johnson v. McIntosh ruling of 1823.

The Court’s Tee Hit Ton opinion was delivered on February 7, 1955. The syllabus of the case states:

The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, an identifiable group of American Indians belonging to the Tlingit Tribe of Alaskan Indians, held [by the Court to] not [be] entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the taking by the United States of certain timber from Alaskan lands in and near the Tongass National Forest allegedly belonging to the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians.

Justice Reed further states:

The Government [Domination] denies that petitioner has any compensable interest. It asserts that the Tee-Hit-Tons’ property interest, if any, is merely that of the right to the use of the land at the Government’s will; that Congress has never recognized any legal interest of petitioner in the land, and therefore, without such recognition, no compensation is due the petitioner for any taking by the United States. emphasis added

Notice that the U.S. government asserts that the Tee Hit Ton people only possess “the right to the use of the land at [subject to] the Government’s will [dominating decision]” and notice how this is related to what the Supreme Court said in its Cherokee Nation decision: “They occupy a territory to which we assert a title [of domination] independent of their will.” It was the “will” [dominating decision] of the U.S. government to “assert a title” to the land independent of [against] the Indians’ will [wish or desire].”

A “wish or desire” is a definition of the word “will” that seems appropriate in this context. It was the wish, desire, or intention of the United States to assert a title of domination over and to the land where the Indians were living. One definition of “domination” is “having to conform one’s actions to a will external to one’s own,” and “living under the arbitrary power [will] of another.”

Reed further stated:

II. Indian Title. – (a) The nature of aboriginal Indian interest in land and the various rights as between the Indians and the United States dependent on such interest are far from novel as concerns our Indian inhabitants. It is well settled that, in all the States of the Union, the tribes who inhabited the lands of the States held claim to such lands after the coming [invasion] of the white man, under what is sometimes termed original Indian title or permission from the whites [the dominators] to occupy. emphasis added That description means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. After conquest [domination], they [the Indians] were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which they had previously exercised “sovereignty,” as we use that term. This [permission to occupy the land] is not a property right, but amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign [dominator] grants and protects against intrusion by third parties, but which right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians. emphasis added

Reed continued:

This position of the Indian has long been rationalized by the legal theory that discovery and conquest [domination] gave the conquerors [dominators] sovereignty [domination] over and ownership [domination] of the lands thus obtained. 1 Wheaton’s International Law, c. V. The great case of Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, denied the power of an Indian tribe to pass their right of occupancy to another. It confirmed the practice of two hundred years of American history “that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.” 8 Wheat. at 21 U. S. 587.

Later Reed states:

No case in this Court has ever held that taking of [the] Indian title [of occupancy] or use by Congress required compensation. The American people have compassion for the descendants of those Indians who were deprived of their homes and hunting grounds by the drive of civilization [domination]. They [the American people] seek to have the Indians share the benefits of our society as citizens of this Nation. Generous provision has been willingly made to allow tribes to recover for wrongs as a matter of grace, not because of legal liability.

The word “grace” in this context means, “favor, kindness, mercy” and, also, “virtue, sense of right.” To the extent that the United States has “allowed” Indian tribes to recover for wrongs committed against them, it has been a result of the kindness and mercy of the United States, based on some sense of doing right,” but not as a legal liability or obligation for the U.S.

---

Cases

• Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/348/272
• Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/21/543

  Series Navigation

Previous: President Teddy Roosevelt’s Monroe Doctrine Corollary (Part 8)

Next: White v. University of California (Part 10)

Copyright

© Copyright Steven T. Newcomb, January 1, 2026