The Haudenosaunee Cases: Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Aug. 9th 2010) - Domination Translator Series - Part 12

Litigation in this case began in 1974, and during the three and a half decades afterwards, the judicial system of the dominating U.S. society developed a framework, based on its underlying claim of a right of domination, that it could use to defend itself against such claims.

A bit of background context seems to be called for here. When we think about it, when ships from Western Christendom first arrived to this continent, the colonizing voyagers made landfall and laid claim to the lands. In other words, they were foreigners who had sailed across an ocean to arrive here to this Turtle Island continent. Consequently, they were making foreign claims to the lands of Native nations. Centuries later, the United States government was able to use its own form of storytelling to turn this around and say that “the Indians” were the ones making “claims” to the land. These were typically called Indian land claims. And in 1946 Congress even created an Indian Claims Commission, which was finally disbanded by congressional action in 1978.

What remains out of focus in a case such as Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida is the fact that the U.S. claim of a right of domination, and the entire anti-Indian federal Indian law system of domination is the operational context for the legal proceedings.

What Were the Facts?

• The Oneida Indian Nation of New York, along with the United States and other plaintiffs, sued the State of New York and the Counties of Madison and Oneida.
• The plaintiffs alleged that New York acquired [put under New York’s claim of a right of domination] approximately 250,000 acres of the Oneidas’ ancestral lands between 1795 and 1846 in violation of federal treaties and the Nonintercourse Act, which prohibits the sale of Native land without the participation and consent of the federal government.
• The plaintiffs sought damages and other relief for the alleged unlawful possession [domination] of these [their] lands.
• The case had a prolonged procedural history, with litigation commencing in 1974 and involving multiple trips to the U.S. Supreme Court.
• The U.S. intervened in 1998, and the district court ultimately dismissed most claims, citing equitable defenses like laches, but allowed a contract-based claim to proceed against New York alone.
• Both parties to the suit appealed the lower court’s decision.

The Issue:

• Whether the plaintiffs’ claims for ancient land dispossession [domination] were barred by equitable defenses such as laches [the plaintiffs took too long to contest or challenge the situation], and whether a nonpossessory contract-based claim [not attempting to obtain the land] could proceed against the State of New York.

The Holding — By Judge Livingston

• The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all claims dependent on the assertion of a current possessory interest in the subject [dominated] lands were barred by equitable defenses, and that the purportedly nonpossessory contract-based claim was also barred by New York’s sovereign immunity and the equitable principles applied in Cayuga.

The Rule:

• Equitable defenses [against Native efforts to challenge the claim of a right of domination,] such as laches can bar Indian land claims if those claims disrupt settled expectations [of those benefitting from the U.S. system of domination that they will be able to continue benefitting from that system], even if the [Indian] claims are legally viable and within the statute of limitations.

The Reasoning Process:

• The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs’ possessory claims, which were based on the assertion of a current right to possession [domination], were inherently disruptive to settled land titles [the U.S. system of domination] and thus barred by equitable defenses such as laches [failure to raise an objection to the system of domination in a timely manner].
• The court noted that the equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility could apply to Indian land claims, even when legally viable and within the statute of limitations, if such claims threatened to disturb settled expectations [of the people benefitting from the U.S. system of domination].
• Additionally, the court determined that the nonpossessory contract-based claim, which sought to reform land sale agreements for unconscionable consideration, was barred by New York’s sovereign immunity because the United States’ intervention did not raise an identical claim.
• The court concluded that the purportedly nonpossessory claim premised on a violation of the Nonintercourse Act was also barred by the same equitable considerations that precluded the possessory claims.

Equitable Principles and Disruptive Claims [to the Claimed Right of Domination]

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the equitable principles recognized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York and the Second Circuit’s own decision in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki applied to the plaintiffs’ claims. These principles held that ancient land claims could be barred by doctrines such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility if those claims disrupted settled expectations [of those benefitting from the U.S. system of domination]. The court found that the plaintiffs’ possessory claims inherently disturbed settled land titles [based on the U.S. claim of a right of domination] because they were based on the assertion of a continuing right to possession of [to dominate] ancestral lands. The claims threatened to question established land ownership [domination] and societal reliance on such ownership [domination]. Even if these [Indian] claims were legally viable and within the statute of limitations, the potential disruption [to the U.S. society’s system of domination and assumed right of domination] justified the application of equitable defenses. The court emphasized that the disruptive nature of the claims [challenging the claimed right of domination], rather than the specific remedies sought, triggered the application of equitable principles.

Possessory Claims and Sovereign Immunity

The court addressed the possessory claims brought by both the Oneida Indian Nation and the United States. It determined that these claims, which sought relief based on a current right to possess [dominate] the lands, were subject to the equitable defenses outlined in Cayuga. The court found that the [Indians’] claims were disruptive because they would effectively overturn years of settled land ownership [based on the U.S. system of domination], thus invoking the laches defense [against the effort to challenge the claimed right of domination]. Additionally, the court examined the role of sovereign immunity in the context of the Oneidas’ contract-based claim for unconscionable consideration. It concluded that New York’s sovereign [dominator] immunity barred the Oneidas from proceeding with this claim because the United States’ intervention in the case did not present an identical claim that could override the state’s immunity [from suit]. Since the United States’ complaint did not encompass the contract-based claim, the Oneidas could not rely on the United States’ intervention to overcome sovereign immunity.

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Cases

• Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010). https://www.justia.com/cases/federal/f3d/617/114/
• City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/544/197
• Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2003). https://www.justia.com/cases/federal/f3d/413/266/
• Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/21/543

Series Navigation

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Copyright

© Copyright Steven T. Newcomb, January 1, 2026