The Haudenosaunee Cases: Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki (2nd Cir. June 28, 2005) - Domination Translator Series - Part 11
The Haudenosaunee Cases
An examination of the historical record with regard to the Haudenosaunee, or Six Nations, ought to begin with an acknowledgment of the free and independent existence of those nations, and the countervailing effort on the part of the invaders from across the Atlantic Ocean, and their present day descendants, to impose and maintain a perpetual system of domination on those nations.
We can begin with the heavily suppressed 1922 Everett Report that was submitted to the New York State legislature by Assemblyman Edward A. Everett, who was the Chairman of the Indian Commission to the New York State Legislature at that time. The original report was rejected by the legislature and the report itself has been almost completely lost. A remaining copy of the report opens as follows: “The late Mrs. L.G. Stillman, clerk and stenographer to the Commission is to be thanked for preserving the only remaining record of that ill-fated Commission.” The introduction to the existing copy of the report reads in part:
The Everett Report was released as a result of the New York State Legislature attempting in 1971 to transfer a parcel of state land which be part of the Akwesasne Mohawk Reservation to town of Fort Covington. The efforts of Chief Lawrence Lazore and Assemblyman K. Daniel Haley among others, were instrumental in negotiating for the release of this document.
To Mrs. Helen Upton, who was entrusted with this report after the death of Mrs. Stillman, and who made the ultimate decision to release this document to us, we [mohawks] say “NIAWEN!”1
Further on at p. “v.” we find: “The ‘Everett Report’ is the only report that has come to our attention which has made any particular effort to encourage and secure a free and untrammelled expression of opinion by the Indians themselves.” And this: “The Commission visited the various reservations of the New York Indians and the report contains much valuable first hand information.”
The framework for the convening of a second N.Y. Indian Commission was set up but as of 1925, no appointments were made to the Commission by the N.Y. Governor’s office. At end of the opening of the one copy of the report in the hands of traditional Mohawk leadership we find: “It is to be noted that Chairman Everett was not returned to the [N.Y.] Assembly and died shortly afterwards. Whether this fact has any relation to the failure to organize the Second Commission to supersede the previous Commission would be hard to determine.”
Looking toward the future, although we do not have the space for it here, there is a definite need for a comprehensive analysis of the contents of “The Everett Report,” which is officially titled “Report of New York Indian Commission to Investigate the Status of the American Indian Residing In the State of New York Transmitted to the [N.Y.] Legislature[,] March 17, 1922.” Lastly, there are notable gaps in the remaining copy of the report.
For example, at p. 4 we find: “In order that this report may carry the information upon which and by which the determination of the status [of the Indian] is arrived at, we submit the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in , the decision of which and the principles discussed by the judge are of great importance in making the legal opinion of this commission. Reference in by the opinion of this commission. Reference is to the opinion of Judge Ray as reported in Reporter 859, p. 468 in 1919 and to Judge Manton found in Federal Reporter 265, p 165 in 1920 and in the Extra Census Bulletin Indians, by Thomas Donaldson, page 4 paragraph 2 “The conclusion is irresistible that the Six Nations are nations by treaty and law etc.”
With regard the doctrine of discovery and domination, we find the following at the opening of The Everett Report: “The first thing to be determined is the question as to whether the Indians of this continent were in possession of this country and whether they sustained the governmental rights to control the territory occupied by them at the time of their discovery by the white man. And the further question as to whether any part of this continent was unoccupied by the Indians so that its discovery could, under the rules and regulations of the Law of Right by Discovery, be taken by the discoverers.”
It continues:
“This determination is necessary in order to legally and properly arrive at a conclusion as to what the legal status of the Indian is at the present day, taking into account the territory he occupied when the white man came here, the territory he occupies at the present time and the examining [of] the facts as to how and by what means and for what consideration [payment] he was dispossessed of that territory which comprised this continent and especially that lying within the boundaries of the state of New York.”
Additionally, we find: “This commission has found it necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the state of New York in examining the historical events as they relate directly to matters of vital interest in considering the status of this state.”
What makes The Everett Report fascinating is its effort to engage in a comprehensive look back at the historical record. Based on what follows, it is easy to see why the New York Legislature rejected the findings of The Everett Report and failed to appoint commissioners to a Second New York Indian Commission. At page 8 we find: “Marshalling all the facts. Which the commission has been able to secure and judging such facts from the findings and decisions of both federal and state courts, your chairman [Everett] arrives at the following conclusions.” I have augmented those findings by using Newcomb’s Domination Translator:
That the [free and independent] Indians of North America were the legal possessors of the soil at the time of the discovery of this continent by Columbus in 1492.
That they maintained a regular form of government [and a free and independent existence] which was recognized by the several countries who visited this continent shortly after its discovery.
That at that time, the [free and independent] Indians on this continent were sufficiently able to maintain themselves against any foreign power [dominator] that visited this continent.
That all foreign powers [dominators] who visited this continent had in view the purpose of establishing colonies and to engage in trade and traffic with the [free] Indians and were received by the Indians in much the same manner as which men held intercourse [relations] with white men.
That no attempt, at that time, was made nor a claim put forward to the effect that treaties need not be made with the [free and independent] Indians on account of the fact that they were not the legal and proper possessors of the soil. Nor would treaties have been made had the Indians been conquered and [this leads to the key insight] that by consummating treaties [with them], we have [thereby] recognized [each of] them as a [free and independent] nation.
The last point needs clarification: The Everett report arrives at the conclusion that the first colonizers did not claim that the Indians were not the legal and proper possessors of the soil, and this is why the colonizers made treaties with the Indians. In other words, according to The Everett Report, the colonizing powers knew that the Indians were living free and independent of Christian European domination when the Christian Europeans arrived, and that Native nations and peoples were the legal and proper possessors of the soil of this continent. This is the underlying reason the colonizing powers made treaties with the Indians.
The U.S. court system, however, has used and continues to use the idea-system of domination against Native nations and peoples, and to deflect attention away from the question of whether the Native nations are still rightfully free and independent.
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki (2^nd^ Cir. June 28, 2005)
In June of 2005, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States issued its decision in the case Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki (referring to Governor George Pataki of New York), which was a legal claim made by the Cayuga Indian Nation that the 1795 and 1807 treaties between the United States and the Cayuga Indian Nation were not valid pursuant to the 1793 Nonintercourse Act, and pursuant to Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.
A June 1795 decision by William Bradford, then Attorney General of the United States held that, pursuant to the terms of the Nonintercourse Act, no sale of land by an Indian nation was valid “except pursuant to a treaty entered into by the Federal Government.” A treaty by the State of [Domination] named New York, which has the nickname “the Empire [domination] State.”
A January 1, 2026 entry on the Britannica website—which was possibly published to coincide with the election of Zohran Mandani, the first Moslem Mayor of New York City—New York’s nickname was the result of a 1785 letter by George Washington. It it, Washington praised New York for its strength during the American Revolution.” Washington referred to New York state as “the Seat of the Empire [domination].” The entry goes on to say:
Washington’s recognition was not merely poetic—it acknowledged the state’s strategic importance. New York’s central location between New England and the Southern colonies, its control of the Hudson River, and access to key ports made it a battleground for control [imperial domination] of the East Coast and the North American continent more broadly.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “Because of the disposition we reach here [to dismiss this case], we need not describe in great detail the long history of relations between the Cayuga Nation and the State of New York.” The court adds: “We set forth below a concise description of the events underlying this lawsuit, as well as a more extended recounting of the case’s procedural history.”
According to the court’s abbreviated historical account, the plaintiffs [the Cayuga], “allege that from time immemorial until the late eighteenth century [the 1700s], the Cayuga Nation owned and occupied approximately three million acres of land in (emphasis added) what is now New York State, a swath of land approximately fifty miles wide that runs from Lake Ontario to the Pennsylvania border.”
Notice the preposition “in” in the above sentence that mentions “three million acres in what is now New York State.” This grammatical “move” grammatically mentally constructs a perception of reality which presupposes that the Cayuga Nation is “positioned” in or within the territorial boundaries of the Empire [domination] State called New York. This leads to the metaphorical framing “in or within is under,” which implies that the Cayuga Nation (along with the other Five Nations of the Haudenosaunee) are all, to some extent, subject to the collective political system (decision-making) of the original thirteen “united” States called “the United States.”
This would appear to reference what Claus Mueller calls “The Maintenance of the Status Quo,” the title of chapter three in his 1973 book The Politics of Communication. (Coincidently, the book was published by “New York Oxford University Press,” and he ends his Preface with “June Farm[,] Towners, New York, July 1973).
Meuller says it is inconsistent with what would be naturally expected of “Western industrial society,” “that social disparities persist amidst plenty while the structure of domination [of Western society] remains virtually unchallenged.” He continues:
Domination, used in this sense, is the control by a limited and relatively small number of people over the allocation of resources and … access to significant participation in the decision-making process.
Expanding on that theme, Meuller further states: “If the members of a political community [such as the Cayuga Indian Nation] are not significantly involved in the decision-making process” of the dominating U.S. society, and if they do not possess “sufficient sociopolitical knowledge” and language skills which enable them to unscramble “governmental jargon and expository style,” which is often “designed to disguise intent,” then they will have no counterinterpretation that they can use in an effort to offset the official interpretations of the dominating U.S. society. In short, if they lack such political and linguistic knowledge, they will not have the political means of challenging the overall system and status quo of domination.
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals went on to explain:
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Neil P. McCurn, Judge), determined (1) that treaties between the Cayuga Nation and the State of New York in 1795 and 1807 were not properly ratified by the federal government and were thus invalid under the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177; and (2) that none of defendants’ other arguments barred plaintiffs’ suit. After ruling in plaintiffs’ favor on liability, the District Court conducted a jury trial on damages, which resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs of approximately $36.9 million, representing the current fair market value of the land as well as fair rental value damages for 204 years. The District Court then concluded, following a month-long hearing, that plaintiffs were entitled to about $211 million in prejudgment interest, resulting in a total award of $247,911,999.42.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals delivered its decision in Cayuga Nation a month after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York. The issue in City of Sherrill was whether the Oneida Indian Nation, after it had purchased lands on the open real estate market within its traditional territory, had an obligation to pay property [domination] taxes to the county in that area? Or did the Oneida people have the status of a sovereign nation and, accordingly, did they therefore have no obligation to pay taxes to another sovereign entity named “County of Oneida, New York.”
In one sense, the issue came down to the question of which of the two sides had a fee title [of domination] to and over the lands under discussion.
As the case states:
“OIN resists the payment of property taxes to [the City of] Sherrill on the ground [based on the position] that OIN’s acquisition of fee title (emphasis added) to discrete parcels of historic reservation land revived [to restore or return to consciousness or life; to reanimate] the Oneidas’ ancient sovereignty [free existence] piecemeal over each parcel. Consequently, the Tribe maintains, regulatory authority over OIN’s newly purchased properties no longer resides in Sherrill.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote the decision for the majority.
“Given the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, the [dominating] regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State and its counties and towns, and the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking judicial relief against parties other than the United States, we hold that the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive [reawaken] its ancient sovereignty [free and independent identity], in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government [control] and cannot regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders.”
At Section I, A, we find:
OIN is a federally recognized Indian Tribe and a direct descendant of the Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida Nation), “one of the six nations of the Iroquois, the most powerful Indian Tribe in the Northeast at the time of the American Revolution.” Id., at 230. At the birth of the United States, the [free and independent] Oneida Nation’s aboriginal homeland comprised some six million acres in what is now [called] central New York. Ibid.; Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 664 (1974) (Oneida I).
At footnote number one, Ginsburg contextualized the case. Using Newcomb’s Domination Translator, I have modified her quote in the following manner:
Under the “doctrine of [Christian] discovery [and domination],” County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985) (Oneida II), “fee title to [and "ultimate dominion" over] the lands occupied by [free and independent] Indians when the colonists arrived became vested [a complete and consummated right] in the sovereign [dominator]—first the discovering [dominating] European nation and later the original States [of domination] and the United States,” [of domination, the American Empire], Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661,67 (1974) (Oneida I).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki in June of 2005, roughly one month after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its May 2005 decision in City of Sherrill. The Second Circuit court stated at the opening of its ruling:
In another case raising land claims stemming from late-eighteenth-century treaties between Indian tribes and the [Empire] State of New York, the Supreme Court recently ruled that equitable doctrines—such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility—can be applied to Indian land claims in appropriate circumstances. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1494 (2005). Based on Sherrill, we conclude that the possessory land claim alleged here is the type of claim to which a laches defense can be applied. Taking into account the considerations identified by the Supreme Court in Sherrill and the findings of the District Court in the remedy stages of this case, we further conclude that plaintiffs’ claim is barred by laches. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter judgment for defendants.
Cases
- Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2003). https://www.justia.com/cases/federal/f3d/413/266/
- City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/544/197
- Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/414/661
Series Navigation
| Previous: White v. University of California (Part 10) | Next: Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Part 12) |
Copyright
© Copyright Steven T. Newcomb, January 1, 2026
Footnotes
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Edward Everett, 1922. The Everett Report. Mohawk Nation News. PDF. https://mohawknationnews.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/everett-1922-document.pdf ↩
SUGGESTED CITATION
Steven T. Newcomb, "The Haudenosaunee Cases: Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki (2nd Cir. June 28, 2005) - Domination Translator Series - Part 11," Doctrine of Discovery Project (11 January 2026), https://doctrineofdiscovery.org/blog/domination/haudenosaunee/cayuga-pataki/.
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